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RECENT DECISIONS
Labor Law: Fair Representation of Employees' Interests in
Arbitration Proceedings-A grievance arose concerning the seniority of four employees who had been laid off when certain supervisory employees were demoted and transferred back into the bargaining unit. Such supervisory employees had originally held
non-supervisory positions in the bargaining unit before they had
been promoted.
In the course of the grievance procedure, the employer contended that the former supervisory employees had continuous seniority measured from the date they had entered the service of the
company while the union took the position that there should be
excluded from such period of continuous service the time spent in
supervisory positions.' The grievance ended in arbitration before a
single arbitrator who received evidence and heard witnesses. However, none of the demoted supervisory employees were notified of
the time and place of such hearing and none were presnt or participated in the arbitration proceedings. The arbitrator's award upheld the union's position.
In an action by seventeen of the demoted supervisory employees
to vacate the arbitration award, the circuit court for Waukesha
County rendered judgment for the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where the union
espoused the cause of other employees, the plaintiffs were, as a
matter of law, not fairly represented and the award would not be
binding on them because of lack of notice of the hearing. Clark v.
2
Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W. 2d 132 (1959).
The problem presented in the Clark case is one that has greatly
vexed both legal writers and the courts. It is the problem of when,
if ever, judicial protection should be afforded to individual employees whose interests are adversely affected by arbitration proceedings.3 That a suitable answer has not been reached is attested to
by the statements of the court in Donato v.American Locomotive Company.4 There, the court pointed out that while the older cases uniformly held that the union has the sole right to bring arbitration
and to seek to vacate an adverse award, "In recent years,... there

has been a growing recognition that the individual employee has
' The contract clause covering seniority read as follows: "Seniority. Is an employee's length of service with the company in years, months and days."
2 Motion for rehearing denied 8 Wis. 2d 264, 100 N.W. 2d 317 (1960) ; cert denied by the United States Supreme Court.
3 Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264 at 269, 99 N.W. 2d 132, at 135
(1959).
4 Donato v. American Locomotive Co., 283 App. Div. 410, 127 N.Y.S. 2d 709
(1954).
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enforceable rights of his own under a collective bargaining agreement." 5 The court then concluded that "The law upon this subject
is still in a state of flux." 6
Until the Clark case, this new attitude toward rights of individual employees under a collective bargaining agreement, noted in
Donato, had been followed in only two New York cases.7 In the Iroquoiss case, certain employees sought leave to intervene in an arbitration proceeding over seniority rights because the union had taken
a position adverse to their interests. The court granted the right
to intervene because the employees were "interested in the controversy which was arbitrated." In Soto v. Lenscraft,9 which has subsequently been reversed, 0 the arbitrator had denied certain employees the right to appear in the arbitration proceedings by their
own counsel. Upon a showing by the employees that the union and
employer were in collusion to discriminate against them, the court
vacated the arbitration award, stating:
Whether petitioners be viewed in the nature of third party
beneficiaries of a contract or in the position of beneficiaries
of a trust, in which the union as a trustee owes them a
fiduciary obligation of fair representation (the label is not
important), they had cognizable standing to seek a vacatur
of the award."
In the Clark case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court goes further than
either the Iroquois or Soto cases in protecting the rights of individual
employees in arbitration proceedings. The court, however, purports
to adopt the test of fair representation employed in the Soto case, as
its standard for determining when court protection should be granted
to the rights of individual employees under a collective bargaining con2
tract.'
The test of fair representation had its origin in Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R." This case which arose under the Railway Labor
Act'1 4 and involved racial discrimination in negotiating a collective bar-

gaining contract. There, the court stated that the bargaining representative had "the duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in be5 Id. at 715.
6 1d. at 714.
7See Manson, Labor Relations Law, 32 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1365 at 1374, where the
author describes the new trend mentioned in Donato as being illusory.
8 In the Matter of Iroquois Beverage Corp., 14 Misc. 2d 290, 159 N.Y.S. 2d 256
(1955).
9 Soto v. Lenscraft Optical Corp., 7 App. Div. 2d 1, 180 N.Y.S. 2d 388 (1958).
20 it re Soto, 7 N.Y. 2d 397, 198 N.Y.S. 2d 282 (1960).
11 Supra, note 9 at 392.
12 The court stated: "We deem such test of fair representation, in determining
when to grant court protection to the rights of an individual employee under
the collective bargaining contract, to be sound in principle and we adopt the
same." Supra, note 3 at 272, 99 N.W. 2d at 136-137.
'5 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
1445 U.S.C.A. §151 et seq. (1952).
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them."' 5 This test of fair representation which has been held to apply
with equal vigor to the settlement of grievances, 6 has been advocated
by Professor Cox:
The relationship between law and industrial relations will be
improved, and collective bargaining will work better, in my
opinion, without any sacrifice of the interests of individual employees, if contracts which contemplate active administration
through a grievance and arbitration procedure controlled by the
union are held to vest the power to settle grievances in the collective bargaining representative, subject to its fiduciary duty of
fair representation.17
It would appear, however, that in its anxiety to protect the rights of
individual employees, the Wisconsin court has misapplied the test of
fair representation by holding:
. . . where the interests of two groups of employees are dia-

metrically opposed to each other and the union espouses the cause
of one in the arbitration, it follows as a matter of law that there
has been no fair representation of the other group. This is true
even though, in choosing the cause of which group to espouse,
the union acts completely objectively and with the best of
motives.18 (emphasis added)

This conclusion of the court appears unwarranted in light of the cases
which have applied the test of fair representation.
According to the recent case of Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers:""
When an employee alleged a breach of a union's duty of fair
representation, the test to be applied by the court is whether the
action of the union was within 'a wide range of reasonableness'
and was taken in 'good faith and with honesty of purpose.'2 0
Numerous other cases, including the Soto case, also indicate that an
individual has no recourse under the doctrine of fair representation
unless he can demonstrate that the grievance settlement was arbitrary,
capricious, or in bad faith 2 1 As stated in Cortez v. Ford Motor Co.:
Our court has repeatedly held that proper exercise of such discretion over grievances and interpretation of contract terms in
the interest of all its members is vested in authorized representaIs Supra, note 13 at 202-203.
16Hughes Tool Co. v. N.L.R.B., 147 F. 2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945); Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41 (1957).
S17Cox, Rrights under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 638 (1956).
a Supra, note 3 at 272, 99 N.W. 2d at 137.
19 Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782 (D.C. Md. 1959).
2od.
at 793 citing Ford v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
2
Renzi v. Oertel Brewing Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 565 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1958) ; Jenkins v.
Schludberg-Kundle, 217 Md. 556, 144 A. 2d 88 (1958) ; Cortez v. Ford Motor

Co., 349 Mich. 108, 84 N.W. 2d 523 (1957); Parker v. Borock, 182 N.Y.S. 2d
577, 156 N.E. 2d 297 (1959); Di Santi v. United Glass & Ceramic Workers,
40 L.R.R.M. 2548 (Pa. Corn. P1. 1959). Also see Soto case, supra, note 9 and
Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, 275 Wis. 495, 82 N.W. 2d 172 (1957), which

are cited by the court in the Clark case.

22 Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., Ibid.
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tives of the union, subject to challenge after exhaustion of the
grievance procedure only on grounds of bad faith, arbitraryaction or fraud.23
The rule laid down in the Clark case that a showing of bad faith or
active discrimination by the union is not necessary to find a breach of
the union's fiduciary duty, seems regretable. The court imposes on the
collective bargaining representative the impossible burden of satisfying
every member of the unit or being held to have violated its duty of fair
representation. In so doing, it also provides an opportunity for every
employee who is dissatisfied with an arbitration award to seek relief
in the courts. It is believed that allowing individuals such free access
to the courts may well prove disruptive of the entire arbitration procedure since employers and unions alike will be reluctant to settle
grievances by arbitration if their decisions are subject to attack by
individuals.
The danger of allowing individual employees to intervene in the
arbitration process and attack adverse awards was recognized by the
New York court in reversing the Soto case. 4 In re Soto2 5 made it
abundantly clear, that under New York law, even where there was a
breach of the union's duty of fair representation, only the parties6 to
a collective bargaining contract have a right to seek a vacatur of an
arbitration award. The court also stressed that an exception to this
rule could not be created by a judicial application of equitable principles but could only be accomplished by appropriate legislative action.
However, the court took great pains to point out that "an employee is
not foreclosed, in an appropriate case, from pursuing any remedy at
law that might be available for breach of a fiduciary duty owing by the
union.

' 27

Thus, it appears that in New York an employee who is

unfairly represented by his union has recourse against the union for
damages. This seems to be a sensible way of enforcing the union's
duty to fairly represent the members of the bargaining unit while preserving the arbitration process from undue harassment.
Another disturbing aspect of the Clark decision is the requirement
set forth by the court;
. . .of the giving of notice, and an opportunity to intervene,
to those employees not being fairly represented in the arbitration
23 Id. at 529.

24 Supra, note 9.

25 Supra, note 10.

26 The Civil Practice Act of New York, specifically provides that only parties to
an arbitration proceeding can seek to set aside the award, and lists various
grounds for which such an award can be vacated. In the first Soto case, the
court had held the individual employees whose jobs were at stake had status as
parties but this view was condemned in In re Soto. Supra, note 10.
27 Supra, note 10 at 283.

1960]

RECENT DECISIONS

by the union, as a condition to the award being binding on such
employees ....

28

As authority for imposing this requirement of notice, the court
on rehearing cited the Estes2 9 and Primakow0 cases which arose under
the Railway Labor Act. According to the court:
Those cases hold that employees have vested seniority rights
under their collective bargaining contract, which entitle them to
notice of, and the right to participate in, an arbitration proceeding instituted to pass on such rights. We do not deem that
seniority rights negotiated under the Labor Management Relations Act, and embodied in a collective bargaining contract,
should be accorded any lesser protection. 31
In reaching this conclusion, it would seem the court ignored one vital
distinction. In the National Railway Labor Act, Congress specifically
provided "due and timely notice shall be given to the employee or emNo such provision for notice is
ployees involved in such dispute.' '
made in the National Labor Relations Act. As pointed out in a recent
Connecticut case, 33 section 9(a) 34 does no more than secure to an employee the right to submit grievances directly to his employer and does
not give employees the right to compel arbitration.
Another objection which can be made against the requirement of
notice is, that although simple on its face, it will not prove readily
adaptable to the arbitration process which has as its purpose to reach
a speedy and inexpensive determination of questions arising under the
collective bargaining contract. Instead it would seem that the requirement of notice will create some new and difficult problems which will
tend to cause delay and added expense to the arbitrating parties. In
each case the union must determine who must receive notice, that is,
what employees have interests in conflict with those advanced by the
union. This determination will not be easy because in seniority or
promotion cases, it is conceivable that every member of the unit could
have an interest adverse to that of the grievant. There is also the problem of what type of notice will be sufficient. Must each interested
employee receive separate written notice of the hearing, or would a
28

Supra, note 3 at 273, 99 N.W. 2d at 138.

29 Estes

v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F. 2d 768 (5th Cir. 1937).

30 Primakow v. Railway Express Agency, 56 F. Supp. 413 (D.C. Wis. 1943).
31

Supra, note 2 at 318.

32 Supra, note 14.
33 Arsenault v. General Electric Co., 147 Conn. 130, 157 A. 2d 918 (1960).
34 Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended, 29 U.S.C. §159

(a) (1952) provides: "Prozided, That any individual employee or a group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with
the terms of a collective bargaining contract or agreement then in effect:
Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
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public notice on the union bulletin board suffice? A special set of
problems is encountered when employees, upon receiving notice of
hearing, decide to intervene in the arbitration proceedings. Will this
not cause a substantial delay in the arbitration procedure? Will it not
increase expenses?
GEORGE F. GRAF
United States v. Parke Davis-In a prosecution by the Justice
Department under Sections One and Three of the Sherman Act,' a
conspiracy and combination in restraint of trade by resale price maintenance was alleged. During a period of time when there was no Fair
Trade Law coverage in the District of Columbia or Virginia, Parke
Davis Drug Company distributed a catalogue containing a schedule of
minimum wholesale and retail prices to wholesalers and retailers in
the affected area. Since Parke Davis made it clear that it would refuse
to deal with those who did not adhere to the minimum price schedules,
most of the wholesalers and retailers indicated their willingness to
follow the price policy.
In spite of large profits obtainable under the schedule of minimum
prices, some retailers refused to follow the price policy. One of these
retailers, Dart Drugs, explained that it was forced to cut the prices
of Parke Davis products since a nearby drug store, a member of the
People's Drug chain, was advertising Parke Davis products at reduced
prices. At once Parke Davis took steps to curtail this price-cutting by
People's, which had agreed to observe the stated price lists. The result
of these efforts was an assurance by the vice-president of People's
Drugs that it would abide by the price policy in the future.
Although Parke Davis' efforts were successful with the People's
drug chain, Dart Drugs continued to retail its stock of Parke Davis
products at a discount. Dart and others finally agreed to stop the advertising of cut-rate prices in exchange for the resumption of Parke
Davis shipments. There was evidence that Parke Davis had decreased
its efforts in the ensuing months under greater and greater threat of
prosecution by the Justice Department.
It was held by the United States Supreme Court that there were
facts in the record which were sufficient as a matter of law to show
115 U.S.C. §1, 3: Sec. 1-Every contract, combination in the form of trust or

otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal. . . . Every
person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy, hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. . .; Sec. 3-Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in ... the District of Columbia
and any State or States or foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.

